CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

The international community has a vital interest in containing violent ethnic conflict to minimize human suffering and stabilize failed or failing states. To prevent destabilizing refugee flows and avert state breakdown, major powers and international and regional organizations have worked in concert to forestall the escalation of internal tensions, while mediating those that are already underway. Techniques of conflict management range from the coercive to the cooperative, including military intervention or peace enforcement (Haas 1994; Cooper and Berdal 1993; Snow 1993; Jakobsen 1996); economic sanctions (Rogers 1996; Stedman 1998); territorial partition with population transfers (Kaufmann 1996, 1998, 2007; Downes 2004); peacekeeping missons (Durch 1996; Fortna 2004); technical assistance or "good offices" for mediation or arbitration (Crocker, Hampson and Aall 2004); electoral engineering (Horowitz 1985; Reilly, et al. 2001); and political conditionality (Vachudova 2005; Kelley 2004a, 2004b).

Since the end of the Cold War in particular, public officials and peace-makers have advocated the use of non-violent mediation of ethno-territorial conflict. This is a desirable means of managing conflict for several reasons. First, cooperative interventions are preferable to coercive mechanisms because they are undertaken with the express permission of the warring parties—preserving state sovereignty while minimizing deaths and the destruction of property. Second, this strategy may be employed by actors that do not have a significant military apparatus (medium or small powers, international organizations or regional associations), thus widening the available pool of conflict mediators and sharing the burden of conflict management. Third, non-violent mediation seeks out positive-sum solutions to conflict, whereas violent or otherwise

coercive interventions impose zero-sum solutions. As such, cooperative interventions are more likely to bring the disputants to the negotiating table, whereas coercive techniques tend to exacerbate tensions at the sub-state level. Finally, non-violent interventions favor integrationist solutions to ethno-territorial conflicts, which shore up the existing state framework, while violent interventions escalate conflict and weaken state capacity. This may in turn destabilize the neighborhood through the spillover of weapons and soldiers from a widening civil war.

Cooperative techniques formed the basis of not one, but *two* regional security regimes in contemporary Central and Eastern Europe. Both regimes were designed to address the dual instabilities of imperial collapse and nation-state creation. At the end of WWI, the teetering Habsburg, Ottoman, and Romanov Empires were refashioned into national states, including Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania—all of which contained large, hostile minorities. To shore up the new multiethnic states and counter the irredentist aspirations of their neighbors, the victorious Allied Powers devised a comprehensive system of minority protections overseen by the League of Nations. Likewise, the Cold War ended with the collapse of the Soviet, Yugoslav, and Czechoslovak federations, yielding fledgling national states, many of which contained sizeable, disgruntled minorities. To arrest minority mobilization and forestall revisionist campaigns by Hungary, Serbia and Russia, western governments developed an ad hoc conflict management regime supervised in ad hoc fashion by NATO, the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the EU. Each of these regimes spanned a period of decades, and yielding a rich empirical history of successes and failures. A review of this record leads to the following question: what accounts for the variable success of non-violent conflict management within and across both regimes?

This book develops a theory of *nested security* to explain why external mediators sometimes succeed in de-escalating sectarian tensions that threaten widespread violence, and

other times not. At bottom, the model holds that cooperative interventions succeed when regional peace is secured by powerful third parties and fail when regional peace is not secured. This strategy has proven nearly useless in cases of conflict spillover or where state challengers gain significant leverage against the central government. Examples include the Transdniestrians in Moldova; the South Ossetians and Abkhazis in Georgia; and Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh—all of which received assistance at one point or another from external states or cross-border kin groups. What this suggests is that cooperative techniques of conflict management depend for their success on hegemonic stabilization of the wider neighborhood.

The research in this book focuses on the record of conflict management in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) because it is the only region in the world where sustained efforts were made to manage sectarian violence using largely non-violent techniques—a record spanning four decades altogether. To explain the variable success of mediation in CEE, I examine ethno-territorial disputes that were of greatest concern to conflict managers in the early stages of the postwar peace settlements. Intensive analysis of these cases demonstrates that, regardless of the method used, identity of the mediator, and historical context, the intervention was unlikely to succeed in the absence of "nested security." More generally, this suggests that interventions aimed at halting spirals of conflict are unlikely to bear fruit until *after* relations between the ethno-territorial minority and state majority[1] are nested in stable regional and hegemonic settings, much like Matryushka nesting dolls. So long as sectarian disputes remain embedded in unsettled regional or bilateral disputes or are subject to conflict spillover from the wider neighborhood, even the best-designed mediations are likely to founder. A stable external

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[1] "Majority" is used interchangeably with the central government and refers to the ethnic group that dominates state institutions; "minority" is used interchangeably with the rebel or weak group and refers to a subordinate ethnic group in the state. Where there is no power asymmetry, the conflict participants are referred to as rival ethnic groups.

environment is therefore a critical precondition for successful conflict management, calling for an outside-in approach to mediating sectarian disputes.

Question and Importance: Why Study Non-Violent Conflict Management?

This book seeks to account for the variable success of non-violent conflict management (NVCM) where external mediators seek to de-escalate minority-majority tensions in a new or transitioning state. In its ideal typical form, NVCM is undertaken by disinterested external interveners coordinated under the umbrella of a regional security regime.[2] Security regimes generally consist of monitors and enforcers—with the monitors scrutinizing the degree of tensions in designated "hot spots" or "danger zones," and enforcers implementing the judgments of the monitors. In the course of intervention, the monitors and enforcers may themselves be subject to regulation by oversight bodies, adding an additional layer to NVCM. Security regimes therefore have the effect of institutionalizing mediations, locking them in for the long-term. For this reason, although NVCM can be undertaken outside regional security regimes, they are less likely to succeed in their absence.

What I call non-violent conflict management is sometimes termed "conflict prevention," defined as "actions, policies, procedures or institutions undertaken…to avoid the threat or use of armed force…by states or groups, as the way to settle the political disputes that can arise from the destabilizing effects of economic, social, political and international change. Conflict

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[2] *Regional security regimes* are designed to halt the escalation of violent conflict in high-risk states that lie within a certain geographical remit. What constitutes a regional security regime? Under its classic definition, regimes consist of rules, norms and/or principles around which actors' expectations and behaviors converge. In this case, actors' expectations converge around the optimal means of halting the escalation of sectarian tensions in weak, new or otherwise at-risk states. The prevention of violent conflict is, in fact, the raison d'etre of regional security regimes, which are founded upon agreements among state governments to provide hard security over a given territory. The strength and scope of such regimes are determined by its architects and enforcers; these are usually regional, and sometimes extra-regional, state powers.

prevention can also include action taken after a violent conflict to avoid its recurrence."[3] Thus,

conflict prevention is aimed at forestalling the (re)emergence of organized violence in

transitioning states. A related technique is "conflict transformation," which generally applies to

conflicts that have already turned violent. Here, mediators seek to end civil wars by

fundamentally altering the stakes of conflict, the conflict participants, and/or the structures and

rules that shape the interactions between warring parties.[4] The guiding assumption here is that

conflicts—even those that have yielded thousands of casualties or that have gone on for

decades—can be definitely resolved through intelligent, targeted domestic interventions. NVCM

differs from conflict prevention and conflict transformation in that NVCM may be applied to

both violent and non-violent phases of conflict. I use NVCM interchangeably with mediation

throughout the book to refer to any non-coercive third party intervention designed to de-escalate

or reduce sectarian tensions—regardless of where the conflict is in the life cycle.

Countless volumes have been written on the topic of how to manage ethnic turbulence

without resorting to force. Scholars and practitioners have conducted both quantitative and

qualitative case analysis to identify the sources of successful mediation in regional hot-spots

around the world. In doing so, they have generally focused on ad hoc interventions in war-torn

states in Sub-Saharan Africa, Eurasia, or Southeast Asia—the three most conflict-prone regions

in the world. The empirical work generally consists of snapshots of conflict that omit

consideration of the regional environment in explaining successful mediation. The present

project offers a corrective to this overemphasis on domestic causes of civil war by examining the

influence of the regional environment on the arc of internal conflict over long stretches of time.

By combining process-tracing and longitudinal analysis, I unpack the causal mechanisms that

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[3] Lund, *Preventing Violent Conflicts*, 2-3 [CHECK]
[4] Lederach and Maiese, "Conflict Transformation."; Rupesinghe, *Conflict Transformation*; Raimo Väyrynen, *New Directions in Conflict Theory*.

connect internal conflict dynamics with events in the wider neighborhood in the course of individual mediations.

In sum, whereas the bulk of the scholarship on conflict management focuses on ad hoc interventions in which third parties "parachute in" to resolve bloody conflicts, the research in this book focuses on long-term mediations that span different phases of individual conflicts. In so doing, I examine each case of NVCM longitudinally to determine why third party interveners succeed at reducing conflict at some times but not others. By periodizing multi-year mediations and tracing the micro-processes that alter the level of conflict from one period to the next, I effectively identify the conditions at time t=0 that precipitate a reduction (or escalation) in conflict at time t=1.

There are vital practical benefits for identifying the determinants of successful non-violent conflict management, as external mediation remains the single best hope for arresting conflict spirals before they trigger widespread violence. Since the upsurge in violence that engulfed Eurasia and Sub-Saharan Africa in the early 1990s, the United Nations and other conflict mediators have urged practitioners and scholars to devise early warning mechanisms and routinized methods of shuttle diplomacy to enable mediators to contain sub-state tensions before they escalate to full-blown war. Once blood has been spilled, internal conflicts (particularly over territory) become much more difficult to resolve due to the path dependencies created by warfare. Ethnic cleansing and separatist violence generate powerful institutional interests in prolonging the violence: warlords and other war profiteers have strong incentives to maintain a state of perpetual conflict so they can benefit from the criminal enterprises and patronage

networks established under conditions of war.[5] If internal tensions are contained in their early

stages through effective mediation, such path dependencies may be fruitfully avoided.

Explaining Variable Mediation Success

So what explains variable success of a single mediation over time? The conflict resolution

literature offers a range of possible answers to this question, focusing on the target of

interventions, the role of mediator bias, credible guarantees of protection, and the timing and

resources of the intervener.[6] Other theories focus on security guarantees by powerful external

states,[7] which can be established through demilitarized zones and dispute resolution

commissions.[8] Still another strand of scholarship holds that the *timing* of mediation is critical to

its success. It may be that peace is possible only after sectarian violence has run its course—

Zartman made the case for exploiting "ripe moments" in conflicts when "the parties' motivation

to settle the conflict is at its highest."[9]

While hurting stalemates, external guarantees, and peacekeeping institutions may be

important for ameliorating violent conflict, they cannot really explain the containment of

non-violent conflict. We therefore turn to the literature on conflict prevention, which

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[5] Stedman, "Negotiation and Mediation in Internal Conflict."; Zahar, "Power sharing in Lebanon."; Reno, *Warlord Politics and African states*.

[6] With respect to the intervention target, some have argued that helping the stronger side (usually the government) to win is the surest and fastest way to halt violent conflict (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline, "Killing Time."; Licklider, "The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993."; Regan, *Civil Wars and Foreign Powers*). A contrasting view holds that third parties can best limit the carnage of civil war by intervening *against* the perpetrators of atrocities, usually the government (Krain, "International Intervention and the Severity of Genocides and Politicides"). Others focus on the role of intervener bias, arguing that interveners with a significant stake in the outcome of a conflict can credibly commit to enforcing a peace settlement, creating the conditions under which both parties will disarm (Carment and Rowlands, "Three's company"). An opposing argument holds that combatants must believe that the intervener has *no* stake in the conflict outcome—otherwise they cannot trust that the third party will not change the terms of the deal to suit its interests (Regan, *Civil Wars and Foreign Powers*). One problem with these explanations is that the target of mediation and perceived biases of the mediator rarely change over the course of a single intervention and so cannot account for the variable success of many mediations.

[7] Walter, "The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement."

[8] Fortna, *Peace time*.

[9] Touval and Zartman, *International Mediation in Theory and Practice*; Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution*. See also Bercovitch, *Resolving international conflicts*; Bercovitch, *Social Conflicts and Third Parties*; Pruitt, *Negotiation Behavior*; and Regan and Stam, "In the Nick of Time."

highlights a number of additional conditions for success. The most important of these are that the mediator should enjoy "legitimacy" in the eyes of the conflict parties, the incentives for peace should be high, the intervention should be early in the conflict, the mediation should enjoy hegemonic support, and the conflict parties should be open to a mediated compromise.[10]

To the first point, mediators achieve legitimacy by being effective persuaders and skilled diplomats. Thus, the "normative mediation" of the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) in post-Cold War Central and Eastern Europe "eased tensions between states…by influencing and persuading actors in situations of ethnic conflict to solve their dispute in a norm-based way."[11] In the Baltic countries especially, "the role of the High Commissioner…was instrumental in limiting further escalation of tensions and keeping options for further dialogue largely open."[12] However, an over-time examination of these cases suggests that analysts may have overestimated the impact of the High Commissioner, while underestimating the effects of certain background conditions.[13] For example, the HCNM was far more influential in the Baltics, whose governments desired to join NATO and EU, than in the Caucasus, whose governments had little hope of joining such institutions. This indicates that success is largely dependent on the target government's incentives to cooperate with the mediators.

This brings us to the second third party factor, which is the size and credibility of material rewards for peace. In post-communist Europe, NATO and the EU used political conditionality to pressure conflict states to adopt liberal minority legislation. Minority protections were thought to placate rebel groups (as well as their homeland states), effectively

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[10] Lund, *Preventing Violent Conflicts*.

[11] Ratner, "Does International Law Matter in Preventing Ethnic Conflict?"., 694; Kemp, *Quiet Diplomacy in Action*.

[12] Huber, "Averting Inter-ethnic Conflict: An Analysis of the CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities in Estonia, January-July 1993."3.

[13] It should be noted that Ratner identifies a number of endogenous and exogenous preconditions for the success of "normative mediation," including the cooperation of the host government and external kin state as well as a friendly normative environment.

reducing their incentives to engage in war.[14] Kelley claims that "membership conditionality"—

offering membership in valued organizations in exchange for concessions—induced Central and

East European governments to enact minority legislation, which in turn alleviated ethnic tensions

on the ground.[15] Vachudova likewise contends that external pressures were a key motivation for

implementing minority protections, noting that "passive" leverage (socialization) and "active"

leverage (conditionality) led the Baltic and Central European countries to liberalize their

policies.[16] In the literature, there is a qualified consensus that conditionality played a critical role

in promoting minority protection and consequently peace in CEE countries.[17] The problem is

that these arguments conflate minority protections and ethnic peace when the two do not always

go hand-in-hand. In Sri Lanka, for example, the implementation of pro-minority legislation

coincided with growing Tamil separatism in the 1980s, which ultimately led to a decades-long

bloody civil war.

A second set of arguments looks at domestic factors to explain mediation success, such as

a liberal government and conciliatory minority. Csergő contends that the language conflicts

involving Hungarian minorities in Romania and Slovakia were primarily driven by political

relations between the majority and minority at the domestic level; international mediators were

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[14] Early conditionality scholarship focused on the lending practices of international financial institutions (IFIs). The concept of conditionality took on a new meaning in the post-Cold War period as NATO, the European Community and the Council of Europe prepared for eastward expansion. At a 1993 meeting in Copenhagen, it was decided that prospective members to the EC must meet a set of conditions known as the "Copenhagen criteria" before they could be admitted to the EC. There are a number of mechanisms by which European standards and norms have been propagated outside EU borders, including norms-transfer (Checkel, "Why comply?".; Börzel and Risse, "Conceptualizing the Domestic Impact of Europe."), lesson-drawing (; Dolowitz and Marsh, "Learning from abroad."), and external incentives (Schimmelfennig, "International Socialization in the New Europe."; Kelley, *Ethnic politics in Europe*.,Kelley, "International actors on the domestic scene."Kelley, "Does Domestic Politics Limit the Influence of External Actors on Ethnic Politics?".; Vachudova, *Europe undivided*.). For a useful overview of this fast-growing literature, see Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, *The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe*., Ch. 1.

[15] Kelley, *Ethnic politics in Europe*; Kelley, "International actors on the domestic scene."

[16] Vachudova, *Europe undivided*.

[17] There are skeptics who question the impact of EU conditionality. See, for example, Vermeersch, "Ethnic Minority Identity and Movement Politics: The Case of the Roma in the Czech Republic and Slovakia." [MORE] Others note that conditionality can only work under a narrow set of conditions. Namely, the promise of rewards must be credible, the rewards significant and imminent, and the conditions clearly articulated and binding (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, *The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe*., ch. 1).

not effective until political moderates emerged on both sides.[18] Other domestic factors include

institutions that promote cross-ethnic voting and power-sharing arrangements that satisfy

minority aspirations for self-determination.[19] Still others argue that conflict management

depends on a domestic culture of tolerance and ethnic reconciliation without which the best-

designed mediations are likely to fail.[20]

A third strand of scholarship explores the impact of wider environmental factors on

conflict management. Some argue that regional dynamics—such as wars in neighboring states—

generate cross-border flows of weapons, refugees and guerilla fighters that prolong and intensify

conflicts on the ground.[21] If a conflict state is situated in such a neighborhood, its internal

conflicts are likely to be much more difficult to resolve than if it were located in a more stable

region.[22] National homelands, diasporas, rival states or hegemonic powers may also intervene in

an internal conflict to achieve their preferred outcome, with the overall effect of intensifying and

perpetuating the conflict. Any of these factors, separately or together, are believed to undermine

third party conflict management.[23]

Table 1.1 summarizes the dominant explanations for mediation success. Early

intervention has been omitted from the list as it cannot explain later fluctuations in success once

the intervention has begun.   I have also omitted factors specific to resolving *violent* conflict

because most of the cases in this analysis are mediations of disputes that have yet to turn violent.

The first three variables on the list relate to the third party factors. Thus, conflict management is

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[18] Csergő, *Talk of the Nation*.

[19] On electoral institutions, see Reilly, "The Alternative Vote and Ethnic Accommodation."; Horowitz, "Electoral Systems: A Primer for Decision Makers."; on power-sharing and consociational institutions, see Horowitz, *A Democratic South Africa?*; Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies*; Sisk, *Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts*.

[20] Kaufman, "Escaping the symbolic politics trap."; Taylor, "2. Northern Ireland."

[21] Salehyan, *Rebels Without Borders*; Salehyan and Gleditsch, "Refugees and the spread of civil war."

[22] Weiner, "Bad Neighborhoods, Bad Neighbors."

[23] Jenne, *Ethnic Bargaining: The Paradox of Minority Empowerment*; Jenne, "A Bargaining Theory of Minority Demands: Explaining the Dog that Did not Bite in 1990 s Yugoslavia."; Thyne, "Cheap Signals with Costly Consequences."; Regan, *Civil Wars and Foreign Powers*; Elbadawi and Sambanis, "How much war will we see?".

more likely to succeed if the mediator enjoys legitimacy in the eyes of the conflict parties, enjoys

the support of hegemonic powers, commands significant resources, and is able to offer a credible

peace dividend. Variables 4 and 5 relate primarily to domestic-level variables. Specifically, if

the state government is moderate and minority elites accommodating, or if institutions are

implemented that satisfy minority aspirations, then a negotiated solution becomes more likely.

Theories about external influences are examined in the context of the nested security model that

is outlined below.

Table 1.1 Alternative Explanations for Mediation Success

Determinants of Mediation Success	Prediction
MEDIATOR FACTORS • Third Party Legitimacy/Resources • Incentives for Peace (big carrots) • Hegemonic Support for Intervention	When the intervener enjoys legitimacy in the eyes of the combatants, commands significant resources, and has credible sticks and carrots to induce compliance, mediations are more likely to succeed.
DOMESTIC FACTORS • Government Liberalization; Accommodation of Minority Demands • Emergence of Moderate Minority Leaders • Power-Sharing Institutions; Minority Autonomy; Ethnic Engineering	When host governments choose to accommodate restive minorities through concessions, and when minority leaders who favor compromise rise to power, mediations are more likely to succeed.
REGIONAL/ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS • Containing Cross-border Rebellion • Nested Security—Stabilizing Regional and Hegemonic Conflict Processes	When external interventions are neutralized and regional conflicts contained, internal tensions will be easier to manage.

The Argument

This book tests the argument that nested security is a necessary condition for successful mediation of internal conflict. The model begins with the observation that internal conflicts are rarely confined to the borders of a single state. Internal conflicts, particularly involving violence, are usually horizontally and vertically embedded in wider regional and/or global hegemonic conflicts. As George Modelski once said, "[i]nternal wars occur not only within a political system but also within an international system."[24] In fact, fully three-quarters of the civil wars waged since the end of the Cold War feature deliberate intervention by foreign governments— most often neighboring states with a stake in the outcome.[25] Civil wars are influenced by the intervention of diasporas (either transnational or trans-border), external interest groups or networks, multi-national corporations, conflict spillover from neighboring states, and events such financial crises or regional war.

Conflict Escalation

Regional conflict dynamics can intensify domestic conflict in several ways. First, the conflict state may be the site of a proxy war waged by neighboring states. The intervention of foreign governments on one or both sides can make domestic battles more lethal by contributing weapons and other resources necessary for the prosecution of war and by generating incentives for the combatants to escalate violence for a greater share of state resources. This is the case with recent or ongoing conflicts in Kashmir, Palestine, Ogaden, Northern Ireland, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Transdniestria, among others. Cross-border kin groups or rebel networks may also fuel internal wars by bankrolling separatist movements or offering cross-border sanctuaries

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[24] Modelski, "International Relations of Internal War." 18.
[25] Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) armed conflict dataset, as cited in Harbom and Wallensteen, "Armed conflict and its international dimensions, 1946-2004." 629. [NEED BETTER CITE]

to guerilla fighters pursued by government forces. Finally, wars waged in neighboring states can produce weapons, refugees and guerilla fighters that flow over the border to ignite or intensify tensions in the conflict state. Resistance movements in other countries may also inspire organized resistance in the conflict state, as individuals and organizations copy strategies and goals from insurgents in the neighborhood or from further afield.[26]

On the global level, world powers with a stake in the regional distribution of resources can intensify bilateral rivalries through *hegemonic tipping*—intervening on one side of the bilateral conflict against the other. Hegemonic tipping exacerbates regional instability, which may intensify and lengthen internal conflicts. Global events can also exacerbate civil conflicts— financial crises, population imbalances, cross-border movements or systemic war can destabilize states, generating opportunity structures on the domestic level that fuel sub-state conflict. For example, the mounting international debt shouldered by the Yugoslav government in the 1980s led Belgrade to lean heavily on its wealthier republics, creating incentives for Croatian and Slovenian leaders to pursue secession when the federation weakened.

Much of the scholarship on the external dimensions of civil war argues for a feedback loop or bi-directionality of conflict processes, where outside actors intervene to exacerbate civil wars, while civil wars suck in external patrons, thereby provoking a wider regional conflict. Indeed, the very notion of "internationalized" civil war suggests that internal conflict spreads beyond state borders like a contagious disease. However, while contagion and spillover effects from neighboring civil wars (refugees, guerilla fighters, movement activists) *do* move in both directions, neighboring states or hegemonic powers are rarely ever "pulled into" conflicts to "rescue" their beleaguered ethnic brethren. Indeed, quantitative analysis shows that homeland states are no more likely to intervene on behalf of their co-ethnics when they are repressed than

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[26] Bob, *The Marketing of Rebellion.*

when they are not.[27] It appears that governments instead intervene for geopolitical reasons or to serve the interests of powerful economic or political elites.[28] This means that the impetus for external intervention is located principally outside (rather than inside) the conflict state.

Conflict De-escalation

Just as internal conflicts are escalated by external actors and events, they are also *de*-escalated by external actors and events. Through *hegemonic leveling*, for example, powerful states can induce domestic combatants to reach a compromise. This works as follows. Hegemonic states can pressure rival states to reach a pact over the minority or territory at the heart of the conflict, effectively de-triangulating the dispute and making it easier to resolve. Hegemons can also stabilize the region by containing wars waged in neighboring states or otherwise controlling the borders of the target state. As the rival states withdraw from the sub-state dispute, domestic tensions tend to de-escalate. However, the combatant parties are likely to remain mobilized because the peace has been externally induced. It is understood that once these pressures are lifted, bilateral rivalry may reemerge, reigniting tensions at the domestic level.

A more consolidated peace is possible when the regional rivals have *endogenous* incentives to broker and enforce an agreement that resolves their outstanding disputes. At this point, there is greater potential for a permanent de-escalation of tensions at the domestic level because the neighboring rivals have realized a joint peace dividend from the deal, rendering it self-enforcing. If these conditions are sustained, the domestic divide may gradually lose its political salience as domestic agents are no longer rewarded for playing the ethnic card by outside patrons or terrified constituents.[29]

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[27] Davis and Moore, "Ethnicity matters."; Cetinyan, "Ethnic Bargaining in the Shadow of Third-party Intervention."
[28] Saideman and Ayres, *For Kin or Country*; Heraclides, *The Self-determination of Minorities in International Politics*.
[29] See the following chapter for a more extensive discussion of this argument.

Nested security is thus achieved by situating majority-minority relations in a stable regional environment, which itself is situated in a stable hegemonic environment. I posit that nested security is a critical background condition for successful conflict management, regardless of the identity and resources of the mediator, the method of mediation used, the domestic institutions implemented, or the attitudes of the government or minority representatives. The following section offers a broad sketch of the two security regimes that will be used to test this argument.

Two European Security Regimes

As noted above, Central and Eastern Europe was the site of not one, but two, regional security regimes. At the close of World War I, the victorious Allied Powers—France, Britain, Italy, and the United States—gathered at the Paris Peace Conference to fashion nation-states out of the wreckage of the German, Romanov, Ottoman and Habsburg Empires. Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia were created out of whole cloth, Poland was reunified after a century of occupation, and Greece and Romania were enlarged. Wherever possible, the Allies used national geography as a template for the new state boundaries. British Prime Minister Lloyd George agreed with U.S. President Woodrow Wilson that "a territorial settlement must be secured, based on the right of self-determination or the consent of the governed."[30] Nonetheless, national communities were often bisected to give their client states defensible borders and access to important waterways and trade routes. The Allies hoped that the new states would thereby serve to prevent revisionist challenges by Germany, Bulgaria, and Hungary, while containing the spread of communism from Bolshevik Russia.[31] Thus, Czechoslovakia received the German-speaking Sudetenland in the west and Hungarian territory in the southeast. The reconstituted

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[30] F. P. Walters, *A History of the League of Nations* (Oxford University Press, 1952), p. 20.
[31] Fink, "The Protection of Ethnic and Religious Minorities." 230.

Polish state obtained vast Belorussian and Ukrainian territories in the east as well as a large

German territory in the west. Romania received the region of Transylvania from Hungary and a

large chunk of Bulgarian territory. A *cordon sanitaire* was thus formed in central Europe.

The impact of this settlement on the inhabitants of East Central Europe is hard to

exaggerate. The new borders separated almost one hundred million people from their prewar

states; over *twenty-five million* people were stranded outside their national homelands.[32]

Millions of ethnic Greeks and Turks woke up on the wrong side of the border, as did millions of

ethnic Germans and Hungarians in Central Europe. This was hardly the picture of national self-

determination envisioned by Wilson.[33] The new and enlarged states now boasted the largest

ethnic minorities in the region. Indeed, fully *85 percent* of (22.5 million) persons belonging to

national minorities in East Central Europe resided in the new and enlarged states of Poland,

Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia; one out of every three people in the region now

belonged to a minority.[34]

The Allied Powers recognized the volatility of the situation. Wilson declared at the Paris

Peace Conference: "Nothing, I venture to say, is more likely, to disturb the peace of the world

than the treatment which might in certain circumstances be meted out to minorities."[35] The Allies

therefore set up a security regime under which the new and enlarged states pledged to observe

the rights of minorities whose disposition could upset the new postwar order.[36] The 1919-1920

minority treaties were fairly limited in scope, confined mostly to negative rights, such as the

right to non-discrimination in employment, the free exercise of religion, and the right to form

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[32] Robinson, et. al., 35.

[33] It should be noted that, despite these defects, the postwar settlement placed far fewer nationals outside their "homeland" states than did the prewar borders (Galántai, 13).

[34] Ibid, pp. 19-22.

[35] Quoted in A. Sharp 1979, p. 175 [CHECK]

[36] Although the resultant document is known as the "Treaty of Versailles," almost all of the negotiations took place within Paris itself. The draft treaty was signed on June 28, 1919 by German leaders in Versailles; subsequent treaties modeled after this one were signed by Austria in September 1919 in St. Germaine; Bulgaria in November 1919 in Neuilly; Hungary in June 1920 in the Grand Trianon; and Turkey in August 1921 in Sèvres.

minority associations; in a few cases, the minority was promised linguistic and cultural rights and the right to territorial self-government. These promises were to be taken as "basic law" (Article 1), meaning that the government could not pass laws to contravene it. The treaties also provided for League monitoring and enforcement of treaty provisions.

Which states were required to sign minority treaties? According to Rene Cassin, the League Covenant "had envisaged sponsoring only the protection of certain categories of men: national minorities and populations of territories controlled by other countries." [CITE] Specifically, the treaties targeted revisionist borderland minorities that threatened to foment interstate war.[37] At the same time, the former belligerents (Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Turkey) were compelled to sign treaties with the League pledging that they would not attempt to regain their lost territories—behavior that would be rewarded by eventual membership in the League.

The League infrastructure was established in January 1920 to monitor compliance with these treaties and alert the Allied Powers of brewing conflicts. The resulting "top-down" regime was formal, centralized, and hierarchical.[38] Individuals, organizations, and governments were permitted to submit complaints of discrimination to the League, which was authorized to rule on these petitions. The Supreme War Council (and its successor, the Conference of Ambassadors, which represented France, Britain, Italy and Japan, with the U.S. in an advisory role), would be called upon to enforce these decisions if necessary.

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[37] Sir James Headlam-Morley, *A Memoir of the Paris Peace Conference 1919*, edited by Anes Headlam-Morley, Russell Bryant, An Cienciala London 1972), 109-110 [CHECK], as cited in Christian Raitz Von Frentz, *A Lesson Forgotten: Minority Protection Under the League of Nations, The Case of the German Minority in Poland, 1920-1934* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 64. [CHECK]. Headlam-Morley was one of the three main members on the New States Committee [CHECK]

[38] This book uses Stephen Krasner's definition of international regime as a "set of implicit or explicit principles, norms rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor's expectations converge in a given area of international relations" (Stephen Krasner. Spring 1982. "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables," *International Organization* 36, p. 3). These institutions can be formal or informal; international, trans-national, regional, or local; governmental or non-governmental.

Although the League system secured important victories in the late 1920s and early 1930s, it began to break down in the 1930s and ultimately failed to prevent the persecution of minorities in Poland, Hungary, Albania, and Romania. Worse, Germany's Nazi government actually managed to *subvert* the system of minority protections, using the pretense of beleaguered German co-ethnics abroad as a means of justifying territorial expansion into Czechoslovakia and Poland.

Reflecting on the breakdown of the Geneva system, one League scholar pointed out that the system of minority protections "was not a substitute for great-power politics ... but rather an adjunct to it. It was only a mechanism for conducting multinational diplomacy whose success or failure depended on the willingness of the states, and particularly the most powerful states, to use it."[39] Likewise, international relations scholar Stephen Krasner writes that the League system failed because "outcomes were the result of power and interests."[40] The overriding consensus is that the failure of the League to de-escalate minority conflicts in the late 1930s owed to Great Power disinterest in backing League interventions with a credible threat of force.

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Some fifty years after the League regime fell into disuse, a new security regime began to take shape in Central and Eastern Europe. Like the interwar regime, the post-Cold War regime was a response to the collapse of the Czechoslovak, Yugoslav and Soviet imperial states. As the republics of these federations declared independence in quick succession, a number of national minorities—including the Croats, Muslims and Serbs in Bosnia; the Serbs in Croatia; and the Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia—also launched secessionist challenges. Non-violent

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[39] Zara Steiner, *The Lights That Failed: European International History, 1919–1933* (Oxford, 2005), p. 299.
[40] Stephen Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 96.

autonomy movements were undertaken by Hungarians in Yugoslavia, Romania, and Slovakia, by

Russian-speakers in Latvia and Estonia; and others.

Western governments watched these events with considerable apprehension, and policy-

makers and scholars warned of a wave of nationalism that threatened to destabilize the Eurasian

continent, if not the world. U.S. President Bill Clinton asserted that "the end of the Cold War

lifted the lid from the cauldron of long-simmering hatreds. Now the entire global terrain is

bloody with such conflicts." A number of scholars, too, predicted that the collapse of the Soviet

Union would lead to significant violent conflict and confidently predicted that we would soon be

longing for the bad old days of the Cold War.[41]

Fearing the spread of anarchy, western leaders attempted to limit the fall-out of

widespread political and economic transition. Just as in the interwar period, the major powers

attempted to shore up the territorial integrity of existing states for as long as possible. In 1991,

the European Community (EC) announced "a common position on the process of recognition"

of new states: the EC was committed to the principles of self-determination and minority rights

so long as they were exercised within "…existing frontiers which can only be changed by

peaceful means and by common agreement."[42] Unsurprisingly, this proclamation did little to

halt the dissolution of Yugoslavia. The EC failed even to prevent its own member states from

adhering to this position, as Austria and Germany openly supported the independence

movements in Slovenia and Croatia; Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina declared independence

soon after.

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[41] See, for example, Robert Kaplan. February 1994. "The Coming Anarchy," *Atlantic Monthly* 273(2): 44-76; John
Mearshemer. Summer 1990. "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," *International Security*
15 (1): 5-56; Stephen Van Evera. Spring 1994. "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," *International Security* 18(4):
5-39; Jack Snyder. 1993. "The New Nationalism," in Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein (eds) *The Domestic
Bases of Grand Strategy*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 179-200; and Michael E. Brown. 1993. *Ethnic
Conflict and International Security*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
[42] Hurst Hannum. 2001. "International Law," *Encyclopedia of Nationalism* 1, 411. Emphasis mine.

As the war in Bosnia escalated in 1992, western leaders resolved to establish a security regime to monitor and de-escalate minority conflicts in the border regions. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), originally a Cold War institution to promote east-west dialogue, took on the mantel of managing emerging sectarian conflicts in CEE. To fulfill its new mandate, the OSCE created the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), whose chief diplomat parachuted into escalating conflict in the region to try to *prevent* sudden crises from devolving into civil and inter-state violence. The HCNM was conceived "as an instrument of conflict prevention at the earliest possible stage" by focusing "on disputes involving national minorities that have an international character and that have the propensity to cause inter-State tension or to ignite international armed conflict."[43]

Two additional European organizations were given a role in monitoring emerging sectarian conflicts in the region. In 1994, the Council of Europe (CE), another pan-European organization, adopted the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages and the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities—the first legally binding instrument for enforcing group rights. Signatory states of the Framework Convention were required to report periodically to the CE Committee of Ministers concerning the treatment of ethnic minorities within their borders.[44] The third, and by far most consequential, monitor in the post-Cold War European regime is the European Union (EU). At the 1993 Copenhagen Council, the EU set out the "Copenhagen criteria"—a set of standards on human and minority rights that EU candidate countries would have to meet in order to obtain membership in the union.[45] These criteria, and EU membership conditionality more broadly, have given the EU something beyond

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[43] Pamphlet No. 9 of the UN Guide for Minorities, 2.[CITE]

[44] Hannum, "International Law," 415; Gerd Oberleitner. 1999. "Monitoring Minority Rights under the Council of Europe's Framework Convention," in Peter Cumper and Steven Wheatley (eds.) *Minority Rights in the 'New' Europe.* The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 71-88.

[45] These criteria drew heavily on the standards set by the OSCE and the Council of Europe. James Hughes and Gwendolyn Sasse. 2003. "Monitoring the Monitors: EU Enlargement Conditionality and Minority Protection in the CEECs," *Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe,* No. 1, 9.

monitoring and closer to enforcement capabilities. In recent years, the EU has even begun to

develop its own military capacity; it is no longer improbable that the EU may someday replace

NATO as the principal enforcer of Europe's security regime.

Up to now, however, NATO remains the de facto enforcer of the post-Cold War security

regime. Particularly in the Balkan wars of the 1990s, NATO (and the U.S. as its leading

member) fulfilled the role of enforcer, peace-maker and peace-keeper of the European security

regime. In those days, NATO was the only organization with a military capacity adequate for

such a role. A natural division of labor soon emerged—with NATO undertaking "hard"

interventions and the CE, the OSCE, and the EU employing "soft" interventions with the

cooperation of the conflict parties. In postwar Bosnia and Kosovo, the EU has since assumed

many of the tasks of "enforcer"—insisting that the accession countries fulfill standards on

minority rights, among other things, before they are admitted as full members of the EU. The

post-Cold War security is widely seen as a success, at least for the region of Central and Eastern

Europe.

Success or Failure?

Many scholars of the League regime tend to exaggerate its failures, whereas those of the post-

Cold War regime tend to exaggerate its successes. The reason for hyperbole is due to the

tendency to assess each regime in the aggregate rather than taking a more granulated view of the

successes and failures of each experiment. Thus, the League has been traditionally written off as

an utter failure, or as a still-born experiment in conflict management, due to its inaction in the

face of Nazi aggression in the 1930s. This, however, overlooks the many apparent victories

achieved by the League in the 1920s. In the words of one scholar, "There are many, I myself

one of their number, who do not believe that the system [of minorities protection] was

foredoomed either to failure or to success…We think that here, as in other vital questions of

peace, there will be a long struggle against the anarchical factors in the Family of Nations, and the success or failure will be constantly in the balance."[46]

Meanwhile, scholars of the post-Cold War regime tend to overstate its success while misattributing the reasons for this purported success. In general, the literature on the two regimes has tended to paper over important lessons in a bid to make broad evaluations of success versus failure. Rather than arriving at an overall judgment of success or failure for the two experiments in NVCM, this book exploits the variation of success *across* each regime and *within* each mediation over time in order to identify those conditions that are broadly associated with successful mediation of sectarian conflict—regardless of the identity of the mediator, the stage of the conflict, or the perspective of the conflict participants. The argument developed in the subsequent chapter is that the mediators of *both* regimes were far more likely to achieve a successful outcome if the conditions of nested security were first secured by powerful third party players.

Why Europe?

The reader might be forgiven for wondering why the analysis focuses solely on conflict management in Europe, and why in particular Central and Eastern Europe, which is not known for significant violent conflict. The most important reason is that CEE was subjected to more extensive conflict management than any other place in the world; no other region even comes close. In contrast to the well-elaborated European security regimes, ASEAN's security apparatus is weak and informal, basically amounting to ad hoc consultations by state governments in the region. ECOMOG, meanwhile, consists primarily of a formal arrangement whereby West African militaries can organize joint military interventions in the region. By contrast, NVCM in

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[46] Julius Stone, *International Guarantees of Minority Rights* (Oxford—London, 1932), p. vii.

Europe is very well-institutionalized, intensive, and extensive—having mediated both peaceful and violent conflicts that span decades. A close examination of these mediations reveals significant over-time fluctuations in success, offering important clues as to why NVCM has met with variable success over time even when conditions on the ground remain relatively constant.

A second reason for comparing the two regimes is that the two are separated by time rather than place. Since both were established to manage conflict in twentieth century Central and Eastern Europe, their pre-WWI institutions and legacies can be effectively ruled out as explanations for any cross-historical variation in mediation success. In other words, variable success across the two regimes cannot be put down to a history of Ottoman, Habsburg or Romanov rule, nor can it be attributed to the location of these states in the buffer zone between East and West, or to the fact that they endured serial foreign occupations over the centuries. Neither can such variation be explained by the region's relative backwardness vis-à-vis major West European states. In other words, pre-twentieth century experiences cannot be invoked to explain differential success rates between the regimes.

This case selection also facilitates *intra*-regime analysis. The interwar and post-Cold War regimes engaged in two broad strategies of NVCM: *preventive diplomacy* and *induced devolution*. In both cases, the third party mediator uses cooperative techniques such as aid or membership conditionality to reduce escalating sectarian conflict. In preventive diplomacy, the mediator encourages the state to implement integrationist policies such as affirmative action or education or language rights—to encourage the minority to abandon efforts to alter the state framework. Under induced devolution, the third party mediator encourages the target state to implement a degree of autonomy for the minority in question; the aim is to satisfy minority aspirations for autonomy, undermine impetus for secessionist movements, and thereby shore up the existing state. Because the two strategies were used in both regimes, instances of each

strategy may be compared both within and across the two regimes to explain why these strategies sometimes yielded success and other times not.

Besides comparing instruments across regimes, cross-sectional comparison can be undertaken within each regime. Because these states were subject to similar regional conditions—including simultaneous political, economic, and social transition—these factors can effectively be held constant in determining why, for example, preventive diplomacy enjoyed variable success over time and across cases in post-Cold War Europe.

Finally, the motives and approach of the interveners were very similar across the two periods. Each regime was intended to stabilize conflict nexuses containing host states, national minorities, and kin states. Doing so was deemed critical for containing sectarian tensions and preventing violence in each conflict case. The motives of the target states were also comparable, as the target states in both periods sought closer economic and political union with powerful western governments—both as a protection against revisionist states and to improve their prospects for development. Because the target states sought closer relationships with the interveners, conditionality became a plausible technique for inducing compliance in both periods.

Plan of the Book

This book has three broad purposes. First, by comparing interventions of the same type within each regime, I show that a single mediator using the same intervention strategy achieved variable success over time and across cases due to different degrees of nested security. By also comparing interventions of the same type *across* regimes, I demonstrate that nested security is a critical precondition of mediation success across different regimes and historical circumstances. Second, since much of the work on the League of Nations is disconnected from the IR literature

on conflict resolution, which focuses primarily on contemporary cases of conflict, it is my

intention to mine this scholarship to contribute to the IR literature. League conflict management

is still routinely dismissed as a "failure" by the mainstream IR scholarship because it failed to

check German expansion in the late 1930s, creating the conditions that led to the Second World

War. By disaggregating the League regime into multiple smaller interventions that are then

traced over time, I hope to contribute a more nuanced assessment of the successes and failures of

the League regime to this scholarship. Third, for the reasons outlined above, the two

experiments might be usefully compared to identify time-invariant features of security regimes

that favor success. This analysis demonstrates that the European security regimes were neither

unique nor non-replicable and that certain design features are associated with greater versus less

success in both periods.

Chapter Two presents the logic of nested security. I begin by demonstrating that

protracted sub-state conflicts are very often internationalized; indeed, the most entrenched

disputes tend to be embedded in rivalries between states or in conflict-prone regions. Domestic

conflicts may become even more entrenched if they are perpetuated by great powers with a

vested interest in a particular outcome. Achieving nested security on the regional and hegemonic

levels is therefore critical to the success of non-violent conflict management—whether the

conflict is just emerging, underway, or in the peace-building phase. The final section outlines

the research design used to test this model against alternative explanations of mediation success.

The core of the book examines applications of the two strategies of non-violent conflict

management. The question guiding the inquiry is what explains variation in the success of

NVCM over time and across space? Chapter Three explores cases of preventive diplomacy

under the League regime. The most extensive interventions under the League's Minorities

Protection System (MPS) involved the German minorities in Poland and Czechoslovakia and the

Hungarian minorities in Romania and Czechoslovakia. Chapter Four investigates cases of preventive diplomacy in the postcommunist period. I have selected for analysis those cases where the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) concentrated the bulk of his efforts—the Russophone minorities in Latvia and Estonia and the Albanian minorities in Kosovo and Macedonia in the 1990s.

The next two chapters examine the record of induced devolution under the League and EU/OSCE regimes. Chapter Four investigates the results of induced devolution in the cases of the Åland Islands, Memel, and Danzig under the League regime. Chapter Five explores the use of induced devolution by NATO and the EU to ameliorate sectarian tensions in the cases of Montenegro, Macedonia and Northern Kosovo.

Chapter Six then tests the wider generalizability of the nested security model by conducting large-N analysis on violent territorial wars around the world from 1946 to present. In doing so, I show that internationalized ethno-territorial wars are unlikely to end in the absence of hegemonic or regional stabilization. Indeed, most such conflicts were terminated through a major structural shift that facilitated conflict resolution. These shifts include withdrawal of rebel support, weakening of the host state, and/or regional deals, which facilitated victory by one side or a peace settlement. In the final chapter, I integrate the findings of the case chapters to arrive at a more holistic analysis of non-violent conflict management under the two European regimes. This comparison yields guidelines for designing effective security regimes elsewhere in the world.

Conclusion

Overall, the analysis in this book provides support for an outside-in model of conflict management, whereby global or regional hegemons (or powerful international organizations)

intervene to stabilize regional conflict as a first step toward successful management of civil conflicts. This success of this enterprise depends critically on the realization of nested security, such that internal conflicts are nested in stable regional settings, which in turn are nested in a stable hegemonic environment. In the absence of this critical background condition, efforts to ameliorate sectarian tensions are likely to founder.

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