

Power Sharing Institutions, Context and Ethnic Conflict in Post-Conflict Plural Societies: a Conjunctural Perspective

Abstract: *The literature on institutional design in divided societies has extensively argued that formal institutional rules which give multiple elites a stake in the decision-making reduce the probability of resumption of ethnic conflict in plural societies. Some of the biggest criticism of power sharing came with regard to its appropriateness in post-conflict societies. Despite this contradiction there do exist successful cases of implementation of power sharing institutional regimes, which have led to continued peace and further democratization of these countries. Criticizing some of the crucial pitfalls of the literature on institutional design in plural societies, this research argues for a complex, configurative approach to the study of the effects of political institutions on conflict dynamics in plural societies. Firstly, I argue for the study of institutional configurations rather than individual institutions, Secondly, I argue for the study of contextual variables as independent variables in their own right. Thirdly, I argue for the study of conjunctural effects of institutional configurations and contextual variables. The purpose of this research is to find those configurations of three power sharing political institutions and three contextual conditions which supposedly explain and predict the success of power sharing in post-conflict societies. This research concentrates on three most crucial political institutions: form of the government: parliamentary, presidential, or mixed form, electoral system: majoritarian and proportional electoral system, and the form of territorial division of the state: federal, unitary or mixed system. Additionally, I argue of the relevance of three contextual variables: the level of ethnic polarization, level of socioeconomic inequality, and previous experience with democracy. To explore the claimed conjunctural causality I will (tentatively) make use of the Qualitative Comparative Analysis.*

Introduction

Institutional design has been in the center of scholarly attention for several decades already. Since the end of the WWII as a result of decolonization, break up of multinational states and secessionist movements the number of states has increased dramatically, resulting in a necessity to craft constitutions for these newly emerging states. One of the main challenges for constitutional designers over the decades has been the implementation of political institutions which could manage ethnic tensions and conflicts and enhance consolidation of democracy in plural societies.

The main problem which plural societies present is the unique context of segmental cleavages which might include, but are not restricted to the combination of ethnic, racial, religious, linguistic and regional cleavages. These cleavages make some groups with objective social characteristics underprivileged with regard to their opportunities for political and economic representation, practice of language, religion, and cultural traditions. Thus, it is generally assumed that in the presence of segmental cleavages minority groups will feel insecure and create intergroup tensions, start a civil war and finally demand secession and refer to any other form of social unrest and ethno-political violence unless special institutions are designed to meet their demands on political and economic representation and cultural autonomy.

One of the main approaches to the problem of institutional design in plural societies has been power sharing which has evolved through the works of Arend Lijphart (1969, 1977, 2004). Power sharing theory predicts that formal institutional rules which give multiple elites a stake in the decision-making reduce (the probability of) ethnic conflict in plural (divided) societies (Norris 2008:23). Rich empirical literature has shown in a number of researches that power sharing institutions in general have positive impact on representation on minority groups, reconciliation of conflicting sides and resolution of ethnic conflict in plural societies (Norris 2008, Cohen 1997, Saideman et al 2001, Reynal-Querol 2002, 2005 Hartzell and

Hoodie 2003; Coakley 2009 etc.). Researchers (Lee 2007, Schneider and Wiesehomeier 2008) have also studied interactive effects of several (though not more than two) power sharing institutions and demographic variables on political violence.

However, some of the biggest critics of power sharing approach to institutional design came with regard the appropriateness of power sharing in post-conflict societies. The argument is that power sharing institutions institutionalize and deepen cleavages among groups rather than reconciling and creating an array for cross group communication and trust-building. Some scholars engaged in case study research have cautioned of the importance of appropriate sequencing of implementation and “degree” of power sharing in post-conflict set up (e.g. Bieber 2005, Lemarchand 2006). Despite this contradiction there do exist successful cases of implementation of power sharing institutional regimes. The empirical puzzle which emerges than is why some cases of power sharing have succeeded in the aftermath of ethnic conflict and others failed.

To answer the puzzle this dissertation undertakes a complex approach to explaining the probability of resumption of ethnic conflict in post-conflict societies. Criticizing some of the crucial pitfalls of the literature on institutional design in plural societies this dissertation offers a configurational approach to resolving the puzzle. Firstly, in contradiction to the mainstream literature this research rejects isolationary view on the effects of separate institutions and argues for the study of conjunctural effects of configurations of power sharing institutions. Besides, in contradiction to the mainstream literature this research regards contextual variables as independent variables in their own right rather than reducing them to a role of controls. Finally, this research argues for a necessity to study of interaction among institutional and contextual variables. The goal of this dissertation is to find all the different conjunctural causal pathways by which interaction of power-sharing institutions and social, economic and political

contextual variables reduces the probability of ethnic conflict in post-conflict plural societies. The argument of this research is that the interaction of the three main political institutions and three contextual variables has mutually related and reinforcing effect on the success of power sharing and can best predict the probability of conflict non-resumption.

The next section will provide a review of the relevant literature, underlying the problems of the literature which this thesis aims to address. The third section will introduce the research questions, and hypothesis. The fourth section is devoted to the description of the methodology, operationalization of the variables and expected data sources. The fifth section will revisit some of the arguments presented in the second section, underlying more emphatically the expected contribution this dissertation aims to make. Conclusion will wrap up the discussion, shortly visiting also the potential shortcomings of the research.

Theoretical Background

Power sharing theory developed through the efforts of Arend Lijphart, who argued for a specific institutional design for countries divided along segmental cleavages. Lijphart summarizes the essence of power sharing as “the participation of representatives of all significant communal groups in political decision making, especially at the executive level”. (Lijphart 2004: 97) Lijphart has developed a menu of appropriate institutions which, through their specific institutional logic should reconcile conflicting groups. The institutions preferred by Lijphart are parliamentarism as opposed to presidentialism, PR electoral systems as opposed to majoritarian systems, federal territorial division as opposed to unitary, bicameralism as opposed to unicameralism. Lijphart has also argued for increased decentralization, mutual veto, and segmental autonomy for the cleavage groups. Discussing the merits of power sharing, Norris (2008:4) notes that in multiethnic societies power-sharing institutions and procedures turn political

opponents into cooperative partners, by providing communal leaders with a guaranteed stake in the democratic process.

The expectation of scholars arguing in favor of power sharing has been that through institutionalizing cleavages and giving ethnic groups a stake in decision making will reconcile ethnic rivalries, resolving conflicts and enhancing democratization in such specific societal conditions. Some of the harshest criticism of power sharing came from scholars who have argued that such an institutional regime is inappropriate for countries, recently emerging from conflicts. In post-conflict situation mechanisms which institutionalize and deepen cleavages, and discourage cross ethnic communication will fuel the conflict rather than prevent from resumptions. Nevertheless, some cases of post-conflict power sharing institutional design have been successful while others have failed bringing to resumption of conflicts.

The broader field of institutional design has suffered from two crucial in my opinion problems. The first problem has been preoccupation with ideal models and templates of institutional design. There has been wide consensus among scholars (Horowitz 1990, 2008; Lijphart 2004) that there is no “one size fits all system and recommendation,” (Lijphart 2004: 99) that in empirical reality constitutional designers divert from one single theory of institutional design, providing for a great variance in the choice of institutions. Once we accept that the ideal models rarely go together and that in practice there is great variation in implementation of different institutions we are left at this stage of the development of the field with regarding the effects of institutions in isolation rather than in their complexity. In this regard Horowitz (1990:75), while discussing the merits and shortcomings of presidentialism and parliamentarism, says that we can not condemn an institution without examining the total configuration of institutions proposed for a given country. The importance of regarding institutional design as a complex enterprise rather than a

pool of isolated and independently functioning institutions is legitimate as far as political institutions in plural societies are connected and reinforce each other

The second and related to the first problem has been the proliferation of researches on qualities and characteristics of separate institutions. Bi-variate empirical researches in the field of institutional design have often argued that separate institutions can produce certain outcomes. My problem with this type of research is that they miss the point that institutions do not function in isolation from each other but are mutually reinforcing each other. Finding that e.g. parliamentarism increases or decreases the probability of eruption of political violence suffers from spurious correlation problem, meaning that it omits the crucial intervening independent variables which link the independent and dependent variables and make the claimed relationship come true.

To illustrate this argument lets look at parliamentarism as an institution in its own right. Parliamentarism can be a power concentrating, majoritarian institution if combined with a plurality electoral system and two party systems, with parties replacing each other in single party governments. At the same time parliamentarism can be a power sharing institutions, if it is accompanied by proportional electoral systems, and multi party system and coalition governments. So parliamentarism does not separately increase or decrease probability of any outcome, but does it in interaction with a number of other institutional features. The capacity of parliamentarism to produce an outcome does not so much depend on its intrinsic characteristics, but rather the characteristics of the specific institutional configuration it exists in.

Researching the bi-variate relationships between e.g. a certain type of institution and conflict resolution, or socio-economic condition and prospects for democratization is useless in understanding ethnic

dynamics or democratization in plural societies as these outcomes are complex in their nature and rarely have only one cause. A more relevant approach is in my opinion to look at configurations of institutions. Studying conjunctural effects of configurations rather than separate institutions would enable to come up with more robust explanatory models for social phenomena and provide additional knowledge about characteristics of separate institutions, as they are changing their qualities while functioning in different configurations.

The third problem with the broad institutional design field has been its attitude towards societal conditions within which political institutions are functioning. Views on the relationship between contextual factors and institutions have undergone a process of a gradual shift from socio-economic determinism (Lipset and Rokkan 1967) towards interdependence between contextual factors and political institutions as two autonomous dimensions. Institutionalists of various degree of institutionalist indoctrination have treated the relationship between societal conditions and institutions differently. Rejecting any deterministic and categorical approaches on the relationship between social conditions and functioning of institutions, this research follows the view suggested in the new institutionalism literature which deemphasizes the dependence of the state institutions on social conditions and vice versa rather favoring interdependence between relatively autonomous social and political institutions. (March and Olsen 1984:738) This research regards contextual socio economic variables neither as determinants of institutional structure nor as its outcome. This research also restrains from reducing contextual variables to controls for isolating the effect of political institutions. Instead, this research regards contextual variables as independent variables having an independent effect of their own.

Literature on contextual variables has been mostly limited to demographic factors such as the size of the cleavage groups, their spatial distribution, degree of ethnic fractionalization, degree of polarization

between groups. Reilly and Reynolds (1999) explore contextual variables which they consider important for selection and functioning of electoral systems for divided societies. They identify three main groups of contextual variables (1) the nature of societal division (the nature of group identity, the intensity of conflict, the nature of the dispute, and the spatial distribution of conflicting groups) is revealed in part by the extent to which ethnicity correlates with party support and voting behavior; (2) the nature of the political system (the nature of the state, the party system, and the overall constitutional framework); (3) the process which led to the adoption of the electoral system (was the system inherited from a colonial power, was it consciously designed, was it externally imposed, or did it emerge through a process of evolution and unintended consequences).

While researching the capacity of proportional and majoritarian institutions to prevent ethnic conflict, Cohen (1997: 614-617) considers three sets of contextual factors: the social-structural position of the groups, demographic position of the groups and historical political position of the groups. Saideman et al. (2002), in their time-series analysis of the capacity of different political institutions to settle conflicts in divided societies, also discuss contextual variables which are relevant on the macro societal level. Referring to Lipset, they consider that the level of economic development matters, for example that in richer regimes the central government can buy off the conflict while poorer countries are less able to accommodate the conflict (ibid: 112). Saideman et al. also prioritize the macro political factors such as the length of the statehood and democratic governance in particular.

More recent researches have also looked at the interactive effects of institutions and social context. An article by Schneider and Wiesehomeier (2008) looks at the interactive effect of the degree of ethnic fragmentation and polarization in autocratic and democratic regimes as well as at the propensity of power sharing institutions to reduce the probability of civil war. Another study by Lee (2007) measures the

interactive effects of configuration of electoral systems and government form, size of the groups, their geographical and the nature of cleavage on the frequency of ethnic protest and rebellion.

Despite the rich literature on the effects of political institutions and contextual variables there has been little research of the interactive effects of contextual variables and political institutions which are closely interrelated and have a mutually reinforcing effect on conflict dynamics. Reconciling all the problems mentioned in this section this dissertation aims at responding to the puzzle of successful and problematic implementation of power sharing institutions in a narrow subset of cases of plural societies where power sharing institutions have been implemented in the immediate aftermath of the conflict. This research argues for a more complex, configurative approach to the study of the effects of political institutions. This research will firstly study not individual institutions but institutional configurations. Secondly, the research will regard contextual variables as independent variables in their own right. Thirdly the research will look at conjunctural effects of institutional configurations and contextual variables. The purpose of this research is to find those configurations of three power sharing political institutions and socio-economic contextual factors which bring to settlement of ethnic unrest in plural societies which have implemented any power sharing institutional means to settle the conflict. The central research question guiding the research is: *What configurations of power sharing institutions and contextual variables lead to reduction of ethnic tensions in post-conflict plural societies?*

Hypothesis

This research aims at specifying the conjunctural causal relationship between the configurations of institutions and contextual variables on the one side and settlement of ethnic conflict on the other side. The dependent variable, the subject matter is the presence or absence of ethnic conflict in plural societies after power sharing institutions have been installed.

The institutional menu of power sharing mechanisms is quite long it is difficult to analyze the possible effects of all the institutions in one research. Balancing between advantages and disadvantages of parsimony and robust explanation this research concentrates on the analysis of the three most crucial political institutions: form of the government: parliamentary, presidential, or mixed form, electoral system: majoritarian and proportional electoral system and the form of territorial division of the state: federal, unitary or mixed system.

The choice of contextual variables requires some more scrutiny to possibly best explain for variance in the success of power sharing in post-conflict societies. Accepting the relevance of the criticism previously received I find it also problematic to try to account for too many contextual variables. At this stage of the development of the dissertation I would argue for the relevance of three contextual variables: the level of ethnic polarization, level of socioeconomic inequality, and previous experience with democracy. The degree of ethnic polarization as a contextual variable is important and has received a lot of attention in the recent research. The logical expectation is that when there is high polarization among groups power sharing mechanisms which deepen cleavages between groups might fuel the conflict rather than reconciling it. Polarization has received sever attention in the recent scholarship on the causes of civil wars. Reynal Querol (2002) while studying religious polarization finds that it has a strong negative influence on conflict reconciliation. Montalvo and Reynal Querol (2005), find that ethnic polarization has an indirect negative effect on growth because it increases the incidence of civil wars and public consumption, and reduces the rate of investment. Schneider and Wiesehomeier (2008) who have studied interactive effects of ethnic polarization and political institutions show that proportional electoral system and average district magnitude can pacify conflict even in polarized societies.

Socioeconomic inequality has not been much studied in the literature which has been more concerned with the level of economic development. With all the due importance of development the most crucial for plural societies is not how rich is the country, but how equally the wealth is distributed. If segmental cleavages coincide with socioeconomic cleavage, i.e. if minority groups are economically worse off because of discrimination, then power sharing—mere inclusion of groups in the decision making might be ineffective. In this regard it is of crucial importance to establish the relationship of socioeconomic inequality with political institutions and its capacity to influence the probability of conflict resumption after implementation of power sharing institutions. To meet the assumption of independence of variables, additional scrutiny is necessary to clarify and delimitate conceptualization and operationalization of socioeconomic inequality and polarization.

The importance of the experience with democracy is in the fact that the societies which might have already had any, even slightest experience with democratic practices might be more prone to positive effect of power sharing as will have the tradition and experience of compromise in decision making, toleration towards plurality of origin and ideas as well as be more inclusive. To summarize once again, the independent variables are of two types: three institutional variables and three contextual variables which are expected to explain the variance in the dependent variable, presence or absence of ethnic conflict in the aftermath of implementation of power sharing institutions.

Now let me turn to the actual expected interrelationship among variables. At this stage of the development of the project I will initially come up with five general hypotheses which reflect the general dynamics among institutional configurations, contextual variables and the outcome being explained.

Low level of polarization socioeconomic inequality provide for the most fruitful soil for implementation of power sharing arrangements especially when a country has previously had an experience with

democracy: *H1 Configurations of power sharing institutions in conjuncture with low polarization and socioeconomic inequality and previous experience with democracy will decrease the probability of resumption of conflict.*

Cases (I assume mostly former colonies, newly independent states) with high polarization and low socioeconomic inequality lacking previous experience with democracy will most probably engulf into new conflicts. In such cases the conflict is deprived of an economic underpinning. However, high animosity and polarization are likely to lead to regained conflict as the past democratic experience of moderation and inclusiveness is also absent: *H2 Configurations of power sharing institutions in conjuncture with high polarization and low socioeconomic inequality and no previous democratic experience will increase the probability resumption of conflict.*

High level of polarization and socioeconomic inequality are expected to hinder the functioning of power sharing institutions as will deepen the already existing cleavages among groups: *H3 Configurations of power sharing institutions combined with high polarization and socioeconomic inequality and no previous experience with democracy will increase the probability resumption of conflict.*

Previous experience with democracy on the other hand might mitigate the effects of polarization and socioeconomic inequality as the latter might be a result not of a systematic discrimination of some groups by the others but a result of the previous conflict. Once socialized in democratic practices cleavage groups will be more prepared to engage in power sharing: *H4 Configuration of power sharing institutions in conjuncture with increased polarization, high socioeconomic inequality **but** previous democratic experience will decrease the probability of conflict.*

Rival to power sharing, power concentrating institutions such as single member plurality or Alternative vote electoral systems, or Presidential form of government or unitarism have been cited to have the capacity to mitigate the dividing lines within societies, through encouraging political participation across

narrow group borders: *H5 Configuration of Majoritarian institutions in conjuncture with high polarization and socioeconomic inequality and no previous democratic experience will decrease the probability of conflict.*

Methodology

The choice of methodology of this research is closely related to its purpose and theoretical underpinning. The purpose of this paper is to find the conjunctural causal relationship between the configurations of institutions and contextual variables on the one side and settlement of ethnic conflict on the other side. To explore the complex causality of institutions and contextual factors this research will (tentatively) make use of the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (hereinafter QCA). In comparison to inferential statistical methods QCA as a research method is particularly meant for researches which assume “multiple conjunctural causation” when a phenomenon is caused not by one or two variables operating independently but by combinations of independent variables-conditions which operate in some of the cases but do not matter in others. (Hall 2003:389)

This method is useful for revealing how many independent variables provide the particular outcome and which of the independent variables are necessary and sufficient. (ibid) QCA deals with complex causality of the variables: outcomes and their conditions Ragin (1987:27) justifies the creation of a special method for investigating complex causality by the nature of social phenomena which rarely have only one single cause. Besides, these causes rarely function in isolation; a specific cause may have a different effect in another context. Every large scale social phenomenon is a combination of conditions that produce that phenomenon. The complex causality in fact is concerned with intersection of conditions. A phenomenon or a social change emerges from the intersection of appropriate preconditions the right ingredients for change and when any of the significant conditions is absent the phenomenon is also absent.

For the purposes of this research, the selection of cases should go through several selection stages. First of all, the cases to be studied should be plural societies divided along “segmental cleavages”. Secondly, the research should only account for post-conflict period to see the impact of power sharing institutions only in this narrow setup. Thirdly, to partially solve endogeneity problem the cases should not have had power sharing institutions before the eruption of the conflict.

To select cases on the criteria of the plurality of society I will follow Lijphart’s (1977) who defines plural society as a society divided by segmental cleavages. Lijphart refers to Eckstein saying that segmental cleavages exist where “political divisions follow very closely and especially concern lines of objective social differentiation, particularly salient in a society.” (ibid: 3) A Segmental cleavage is separate from other political divisions by specific disagreements over policy and procedural issues with the cultural differences resulting from the different modes of interpreting the political world and divided or plural societies. (Zuckerman 1975). The classic volume by Lipset and Rokkan identifies 4 types of segmental cleavages: religious, ethnic, regional and social-class (Lipset and Rokkan 1967).

To have a more empirical argument for case selection I will take as my starting point Alesina et al (2003) fragmentation index widely used in the literature for its comprehensive conceptualization and measurement of ethnic groups. (I will not for sure use the ELF index and consider that Alesian 2003 has some crucial advantages as compared to Fearon’s 2003 index). Fragmentation indexes being the only numerical measure of division of societies are, however, unsatisfactory criterion for defining a country as a divide or plural society. The problem with these indexes is that they only indicate a numerical composition of the society and do not tell us anything of the intensity of cleavage as the numerical number of groups still does not mean a presence of division, tension and hostility among groups. An

additional criterion of case selection for this reason should probably be previous research on cases which do not have high fragmentation index or which are e.g. substate units (e.g. Northern Ireland). To further filter cases and select only the post-conflict power sharing countries I will use Gleditsch et al (2002) data set on armed conflict worldwide since the end of the WWII. I will restrain at this moment naming the exact countries to be included in the analysis as a lot will depend on the availability of the data.

Data on institutional variables will be exported from “A Comparative Data Set on Political Institutions” compiled by Lundell and Karvonen (2003) at the Department of Political Science, Åbo Akademi, Finland. To select data on polarization, first a refinement of the concept would be necessary so as to make sure that the concept and the appropriate measurement of polarization does not identical or is not highly correlated with the measurement of socioeconomic inequality. Tentatively, I plan to make use of the polarization data set developed by Reynal-Querol¹ Data on ethnic polarization will be exported from Reynal Querol’s data set on ethnic and religious polarization. Gini index will serve as a proxy for socioeconomic inequality. Selection of the data on democratic experience requires clarification of the concept of democracy which, for the purposes of this paper will be regarded in its minimal form, restraining to electoral democracy.

Contribution

This dissertation is meant to contribute to the literature in several ways. The first and most important contribution is the application of conjunctural logic and QCA to the explanation of the impact of power sharing and contextual variables on probability of conflict resumption in post-conflict periods. Related to this is the second line of contribution of looking not at separate power sharing institutions but at

¹ Available here: http://www.econ.upf.edu/~reynal/data_web.htm

institutional configurations and their interaction with contextual variables regarded as independent variables in their own right. Additionally, this approach is expected to contribute to the recent wave of literature on polarization through looking at its interaction with other structural conditions and political institutions on the probability of ethnic conflict. This approach is expected to provide a robust explanatory model for the explanation of the probability of resumption of conflict in plural societies.

This perspective can also generate policy guidelines for agencies engaged in peacebuilding and democracy promotion in plural, post-conflict societies with regard the appropriateness of power sharing institutions in unfavorable conditions, provide insights into correct sequencing of implementation of political institutions as well as the degree of implementation of those institutions. So, for example if the research finds that socioeconomic inequality and polarization in conjuncture with power sharing institutions have a negative impact than the appropriate agencies might think of (1) not using power sharing institutions, (2) restricting the “degree” of power sharing e.g. introducing less proportional but more integrative electoral system (Single Transferable Vote instead of PR list or decrease district magnitude) which in addition to providing seats to all cleavage groups would also enhance cross group voting, or instead of introducing an ethnofederalism introduce a hybrid unitary-federal system similar to Spanish one (3) relevant organizations might think of introducing first more redistributive economic policies to reduce socioeconomic inequality or programs at encouraging cross group reconciliation, communication, trust-building to tackle ethnic polarization before introducing power sharing institutions

Conclusion

Conflict dynamics in plural societies have received considerable attention in social sciences. The literature provides theoretical approaches to institutional design in plural societies, extensive case study literature explains causes of conflicts in particular cases while recent large N studies have tried to come

with some generalizable conclusions on the impact of political institutions in those societies. One of the most important theoretical approaches to institutional design- power sharing theory has received the harshest critic from the scholars arguing for its inappropriateness for post-conflict societies. However, the literature on plural societies in general and post-conflict power sharing in particular has not gone further than looking at individual and interactive effects of political institutions. Contextual variables, also mainly referring to demographic characteristics of plural societies, have been used in the empirical literature to isolate the impact of institutions rather than analyze them as independent variables in their own right.

Addressing these problems of the empirical literature on the causes of ethnic conflict in plural societies this dissertation undertakes a macro perspective and argues for configurational approach to the explanation of the probability of ethnic conflict in plural societies. The dissertation aims at finding all the different conjunctural causal pathways by which interaction of the three power sharing institutions and three socioeconomic contextual variables lessens the probability of resumption of ethnic conflict in plural societies in the aftermath of previous conflict. The dependent variable is the absence or presence of ethnic conflict in plural societies in the aftermath of implementation of power sharing institutions. Looking for a balanced, middle ground between parsimony and robustness of explanatory models this dissertation looks at three most important institutional variables: electoral system, government form, and territorial division; and three contextual variables: degree of ethnic polarization, degree of socioeconomic inequality as well as previous experience with democracy.

The tentative hypotheses argue that (1) lower levels of ethnic polarization and inequality and previous democratic experience will be the best soil for implementation of power sharing institutions with the latter having a positive impact on conflict prevention in post-conflict setup (2) power sharing institutions will

be unable to sustain peace in the presence of ethnic polarization and absence of previous experience of democracy even if the conflict lacks an economic underpinning (3) power sharing will be unable to sustain peace if societies have high polarization and high inequality and lack previous democratic experience (4) that power sharing will be successful if a society has high degree of polarization and economic inequality **but** has previous democratic experience (5) that intrinsically less divisive majoritarian institutions are better suited to sustain peace if the country has lacked previous democratic experience.

The research has several potential shortcomings which need to be highlighted and addressed. As many other researches in this field endogeneity problem is able to invalidate the whole enterprise. Additional methodological scrutiny will be necessary to make sure that the independent variables which are supposed to explain the dependent variable have not actually been caused by the dependent variable. As already mentioned conceptual clarification is necessary to delimit the concepts of polarization and socio-economic inequality and make sure that these two independent variables are independent of each other. Even a bigger problem which is also more difficult to tackle is that the independent variables of the research are static with little variance over time while the dependent variable is not static. The question to constantly haunt myself with is how static independent variables are going to explain the variance in a dynamic dependent variable.

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